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U.S.S. TULSA,
% Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Calif.
1 November 1944.

SECRET

From: Commander Task Unit, 78.1.7
To : Commander Task Force 78.
 by te
Subject: [REDACTED] Operation, report of.
Reference: (a) Courtrainsdiv 24 Attack Landing
 Order No. 18-44.

1. At about 0820 I, A-day, the control group consisting of PC's 623, 598, 1129 and S.C. 726 departed from the transport area. Ships were in assigned positions at 0850 I.

2. No return fire from the beaches was observed until about 0940 I or until just shortly before the first wave crossed the line of departure when mortar fire and fire from what subsequently proved to be a 75 commenced. As wave number one proceeded toward the beach the rate of return fire increased. One landing boat was sunk, one received a hit on the ramp and several were slightly damaged. This return fire continued intermittently throughout the day but all shots observed fell short of the line of departure about 200-500 yards.

3. During the approach of the landing assault waves the minesweepers completed sweeping and proceeded to seaward via the boat lane. This caused some confusion.

4. The timing of the first eleven boat waves was perfect. Boat waves arrived at the line of departure one to three minutes early and in good formation. The boat discipline of the small craft from the transports was excellent. This was not true of the ESB boats since almost without exception after retracting these boats returned to seaward via the approach lane instead of outside this lane.

5. The firing of the rocket ships was well executed except there appeared to be a larger number of shorts than usual. This can be attributed to the fact that the heaviest concentration was laid from the beach inland 200 yards in order to eliminate beach defenses reported as concentrated in that area.

6. Due to failure of communications wave number 12 was seven minutes late in leaving line of departure. Based on report of surveys received on A-1 day it was assumed that Red beach was suitable for LST landings. This wave approached the beach under fire which was concentrated mainly on the ships on the left flank. Three LST's received direct hits. First reports from the beach reported beaching with dry ramps. This report was in error and subsequently all LST's except the 452 retracted having grounded approximately 100-200 yards from the beach with 4-6 feet of water at the ramps. LST 452 which beached within about 40-50 yards succeeded in unloading her mobile equipment.

7. Red beach was surveyed on A-day and A+1 day. It was apparent that LST's could not beach due to the sand bars paralleling the shore line and causing the LST's to ground at the stern. Unloading thru the water except at the extreme left end of the beach proved impossible since the depth of water between sand bars averaged from 6-10 feet. On the morning of A+1 day sufficient pontoon causeways were on hand to unload three ships. At the same time unloading via LCT's ramp to ramp with LST's was commenced. Although considerable progress was made on A+1 and substantially all artillery was landed, unloading was slow and generally unsatisfactory for the following reasons:

(a) The left end of the beach which appeared to have the best gradient was evacuated due to continued mortar and sniper fire which lasted until the morning of A+3.

(b) The shore party was unable to move equipment and stores rapidly from the beach to the dump areas. This situation did not improve appreciably until late on A+3 day.

(c) The shifting of causeways to compensate for distances from the beach of the different LST's caused delays of from 1-2 hours more than the normal time required to place a causeway in position.

8. Diversion of ships to White Beach for unloading was commenced on A+2 day and on completion of the unloading of exhelon L3. Red beach was abandoned for use by LST's.

9. Since this operation included the use of Cincpac vessels particularly transports the following comments are considered of interest:

(a) Boat group commanders of the landing assault waves remain close off the beach to regulate traffic, direct salvage and evacuation of casualties and assist beachmaster after he lands.

(b) Salvage boats follow first assault wave.

(c) Medical boats and spare boats follow second assault wave.

(d) The medical plan provides for immediate evacuation of early casualties.

(e) The organization of the transport units is standardized, flexible and efficient.

10. The beach parties functioned in a highly satisfactory manner. The transport beach parties were withdrawn at 1700, A-day. Beach parties #1 and #4 have performed their duties in a highly commendable manner and are worthy of commendation for a very efficient performance under unusually strenuous conditions.

11. All personnel under my observation performed their duties in accordance with the best traditions of the service.



N. D. BRANTLEY.

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Serial No. 00938


SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

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5 DEC 1944

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on:
Cdr. Task Gp 78.1.7 Secret
ltr of 1 Nov. 1944.

From: Commander Task Force 78.
(Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force).
To : Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet).
Via : Commander Task Force 77.
(Commander SEVENTH Fleet).
2246
Subject: [REDACTED] Operation, report of.
1. Forwarded.


G. D. MORRISON,
Assistant Chief of Staff,
Operations.

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UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

Al6-3(F-3-4/whr)

Serial 002492


Reg. No.	0M-013360
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SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
Com. TG 78.1.7 secret
ltr. of 1 Nov. 1944.

From: Commander Seventh Fleet.
To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Leute
Subject: [REDACTED] Operation, report of.
1. Forwarded.



J.H. LONG.
By direction.

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